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Abstract 
In order to enhance data transmission security within internet network, this paper consider a signature reconfiguration scheme over 
wavelength-coded network coder/decoders (codecs). We propose the reconfiguration scheme of composite signatures in which 
optical network codecs reconfigure their signature keys in a tractable way to enhance system confidentiality for coded wavelength-
division multiplexing (WDM) transmissions. Based on conventional maximal-length sequence (M-sequence) codes over arrayed-
waveguide-grating (AWG) codecs, composite signatures of relative prime-length M-sequence codes are structured to identify 
network node users. Network codecs change their signatures dynamically such that eavesdroppers cannot keep up with the speed 
of code changing, and thus unable to detect the channel waveform to descramble the code. Evaluated results show the effectiveness 
of the proposed approach via composite signatures reconfiguration against practical eavesdropping. 
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1. Introduction  
Coded wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) is an attractive multi-user technique in local area networks 
(LANs) and the first mile1. Interest in coded-WDM has been steadily growing in recent decades. This trend, as a 
pragmatic solution for residential access, is accelerating due to the maturity of the optical fibre in the first mile and the 
establishment of passive optical network (PON). Coded-WDM is a promising technique for next-generation broadband 
access networks as it provides the following advantages: Asynchronous access capability, accurate arrival time 
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measurements, user allocation flexibility and the ability to support variable bit rates2-4. However, weaknesses, 
including susceptibility to eavesdropping, have recently reported in coded-WDM systems5-7.  
As respectively noted by Prucnal8.9 and Shake10, coded-WDM techniques suffer from inherent security 
disadvantages. In such systems, an eavesdropper can use a simple energy detector to detect whether energy is present 
or not in each bit interval. In such cases, there is no security at all because the energy detector output contains the 
user’s data stream. Also, a coded-WDM encoder uses the same fixed code repeatedly over a large number of bits. 
Consequently, an eavesdropper equipped with a sophisticated detector on the path to an isolated single user may be 
able to tap into the network and recover specific code, under sufficient signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Thus, to ensure 
the network security in the physical layer, enhanced confidentiality mechanisms incorporating composite signature 
codecs is proposed in coded-WDM data systems.  
Data network confidentiality can be enhanced by optical signal processing. Among these methods, three main 
approaches are adopted: Increasing code-space size10, reducing subscriber transceiver power and frequently changing 
signature codes11. By employing the third approach, eavesdroppers cannot keep up with the speed of code changing, 
and thus fail to detect the channel waveform to descramble the code. Early incoherent wavelength-coded multiple-
access networks used pseudo-orthogonal sequences to encode signals in the time domain. However, the length of the 
resulting codes was considerable, and multiple-access interference limited the number of users simultaneously 
accessing the system. Huang12 proposed a reconfiguration scheme based on conventional maximal-length sequence 
(M-sequence) codes over arrayed-waveguide-grating (AWG) codecs. The most significant advantage of composite M-
sequences is its cycle characteristics. This property can be used in data security mechanisms to secure network 
communications, as well as increasing the capacity by adding users to a common channel and eliminating interferences 
and crosstalk.  
In this paper, we adopt a dynamically reconfigurable mechanism over the spectral-amplitude-coding (SAC) scheme 
of coded-WDM to counter eavesdropping. Relative prime-length M-sequences are composed of composite code sets 
to govern a reconfigurable network that protects users from tapping by changing signatures. Furthermore, we structure 
AWG codec pairs, along with the corresponding switches, to implement complex coding in the proposed system. By 
exploiting linear cyclic, periodic, and virtually orthogonal characteristics of M-sequence codes, we exemplify 
signature reconfiguration over AWG-based network codecs in this work.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly outlines the dynamic reconfiguration scheme 
consisting of composite signatures of M-sequence codes. Section 3 describes how the proposed reconfigurable scheme 
operates to prevent eavesdroppers from solving the user’s code, resulting in improved security. Section 4 analyses the 
security performance of the proposed signature coding and reconfiguration scheme. Section 5 quantifies the probability 
intercepting into the degree of network confidentiality. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and presents our conclusions.  
 
2. Structure of composite signature codecs for coded-WDM network 
To enhance network confidentiality, the proposed codec dynamically changes its signature keys by cyclically right-
shifting one chip in a fixed period. The change is based on the assumption that the upper layers of the network can 
effectively detect the eavesdroppers. The reconfiguration command changes the signature code to a new one. If a 
tapper attacks the network frequently, the change time becomes short, making the optical switch operate faster to 
reconfigure the codes so that the tapping process is blocked. On the other hand, if the network is mostly in a secure 
environment, the frequency of signature code changing is less. The detailed specifications for the central controller 
node are considerably complex and are beyond the scope of this paper. Interested reader can refer to the article13 for 
more information. Figure 1 shows how the composite signature codecs are reconfigured to enhance coded-WDM 
network confidentiality.ġ 
At the transmitter, the downlink signal is modulated by a broadband light source (BLS). The sending signal is 
encoded by two AWGs to achieve coding encryption. Then encrypted signals are integrated by a star coupler and 
transmitted to a fiber channel. When the center node receives an abnormal eavesdropping message, it sends a 
synchronous control signal to the receiving ends to change the codes. At the receiver, two groups of AWGs including 
the identical and complementary codes are used to decode the received signals. The central node monitors all network 
traffic in real-time, which may has a heavy burden since all traffic must pass through it.ġġ
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Fig. 1. Schematic coded-WDM network with reconfigurable composite signature codecs.ġġ
 
In this paper, composite code of length n=n1n2=21 is derived by combining two M-sequence codes of code lengths 
n1=3 and n2=7, respectively. For conventional M-sequence codes are used, a network only supports 3 or 7 users. 
However, with the proposed composite code, it can accommodate as many as 21 users in the same wavelength band 
without mutual interference. From the eavesdropper’s point of view, if an M-sequence code TiC1 (n1=3) in Fig. 2(a) 
is assigned to a user, the eavesdropper has a probability of 1/3 of detecting the code correctly. On the other hand, as 
shown in Fig. 2(b), the probability is 1/7 for using code set TjC2 (n2=7). However, if a composite code S(i,j) = TiC1Ͱ
TjC2 (n=21) in Fig. 2(c) is used, the probability of interception is lowered to 1/21. Therefore, using the proposed code 
for transmission makes eavesdropper take more time to guess the correct signature.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Composite signature codes S(i,j) from M-sequences TiC1 and TjC2. (a) 7 blocks of TiC1 sequences; (b) 3 blocks 
of TjC2 sequences; (c) Composite signatures S(i,j) =TiC1ͰTjC2 for 3 illustrative users, each with 3 code members.ġġ
 
3. Transmitted signal spectra on signature reconfigurations  
In the discussed reconfiguring schemeġ in Section 2, the codecs changes its signature codes dynamically. 
Considering an example of coded-WDM network with three transceiver pairs, user#1 is the intended communicating 
user, and then user#2 and #3 are interference terms. We present the codecs operation before and after reconfiguration 
using numerical coding data. Schematics drawing of the proposed AWG encoder is shown in Fig. 3. The optical switch 
connects to the corresponding AWG input to compose a set of composite codes. In this scheme, we can randomly 
select two or more AWGs to structure the composite signature codes.ġġ
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Fig. 3. Schematic drawing of composite code encoder.  
 
In our illustration in Figs. 3 and 4, we select 3u3 AWG and 7u7 AWG for network transceivers to compose their 
signature coder/decoders. Before signature reconfiguration, we suppose that the composite code for the user pair 
(XTR#1, RCV#1) is combined from M-sequence codes C1 = (110, …) and C2 = (1110010, …):  
S(0,0) = C1 T0C2 = (001 111 101 010 011 000 100).  
For user pair (XTR#2, RCV#2), the composite signature code is from TC1= (011, …) and T3C2= (0101110, …):  
S(1,3) = TC1T3C2= (001 100 010 000 111 110 101).  
And the composite code for user pair (XTR#3, RCV#3) is made of by TC1 = (011, …) and T5C2 = (1001011, …):  
S(1,5) = T1C1 TĶC2ġ= (111 110 101 001 100 010 000). 
The transmitted spectral signal prior to signature reconfiguration thus takes the form Y(pri) = d1S(0,0) +d2S(1,3) +d3S(1,5), 
where d1, d2, and d3 are information bits sequence to be coded with the corresponding signatures in the three user pairs. 
For consecutive data bits sequence of XTR#1 being d1 = (1, 1, …), of XTR#2 being d2 = (0, 1, …) and of XTR#3 being 
d3 = (1, 0, …), the coded signature chips combine together to form the transmitted composite spectral signal prior to 
signature reconfiguration:  
Y(pri) = [Y(pri),1, Y(pri),2, …] = d1S(0,0) + d2S(1,3) + d3S(1,5)  
= [(112 221 202 011 111 010 100), (002 211 111 010 122 110 201), …].  
Table I summarizes the coded spectral sequences prior to signature reconfigurations for the illustrative transceivers. 
The composite spectral signal Y(pri), before signature reconfiguration, is transmitted over optical fiber link to the optical 
receiver in the network.  
Table I. Composite signal spectra: Prior to signature reconfiguration.  
User data bits Coded spectral signals Transmitted composite spectra 
d1ġľġĩ1, 1, …) S1
(0,0) = T0C1T0C2  
= (001 111 101 010 011 000 100) 
Y(pri) = [Y(pri),1, Y(pri),2, …]  
= d1S1(0,0) + d2S2(1,3) + d3S3(1,5)  
   = [(112 221 202 011 111 010 100),  
   (002 211 111 010 122 110 201),  
…].  
d2 ľġĩ0, 1, …) S2
(1,3) = T1C1T3C2  
= (001 100 010 000 111 110 101) 
d3ġľġĩ1, 0, …) S3
(1,5) = T1C1T5C2  
= (111 110 101 001 100 010 000) 
 
On posterior to signature reconfiguration, signature keys of the transceivers can change into other code state. 
Assume that user pair (XTR#1, RCV#1) changes its code state from S1(0,0) to S1(1,0), user pair (XTR#2, RCV#2) changes 
from S2(1,3) to S2(2,3) and user pair (XTR#3, RCV#3) changes from S3(1,5) to S3(0,5). The consecutive coded signature 
chips d1S1(1,0), d2S2(2,3), and d3S3(0,5) will combine together to result in a transmitted composite spectral signal after 
signature reconfiguration:  
Y(pst) = [Y(pst),1, Y(pst),2, …] = d1.S1(1,0) + d2.S2(2,3) + d3.S3(0,5)  
= [(110 021 000 211 111 212 102), (211 020 100 221 111 101 012), …].  
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Table II summarizes the coded spectral sequences posterior to signature reconfigurations for the illustrative 
transceivers.ġThe composite spectral signal Y(pst), after signature reconfiguration, is transmitted over optical fiber link 
to the optical receiver in the network.  
 
Table II. Composite signal spectra: Posterior to signature reconfiguration. 
User data bits Coded spectral signals Transmitted composite spectra 
d1ġľġĩ1, 1, …) S1
(1,0) = T1C1T0C2 
= (100 010 000 111 110 101 001) Y(pst) = [Y(pst),1, Y(pst),2, …]  
= d1S1(1,0) + d2S2(2,3) + d3S3(0,5)  
   = [(110 021 000 211 111 212 102),  
   (211 020 100 221 111 101 012),  
…].  
d2ġľġĩ0, 1, …) S2
(2,3) = T2C1T3C2 
= (111 010 100 110 001 000 011) 
d3 ľġĩ1, 0, …) S3
(0,5) = T0C1T5C2 
= (010 011 000 100 001 111 101) 
 
Note that the signal is the summation in spectral amplitude of the individual signal chips from each encoder. Other 
possible combinations of logic “1” and logic “0” information data bits on composite spectral signature coding can 
similarly deduced.  
 
4. Perspectives on eavesdropper before and after reconfigurations  
On the receiver side, as depicted in Fig. 4, a pair of AWGs with signature key Su(i,j) and complementary signature 
key Su(i,j) is adopted for the u-th receive-decoder. The combined spectral signal Y from the optical fiber channel is 
directed to the (i+1)-th and the (j+1)-th input ports of the 3x3 and 7x7 AWG decoders. Correlations subtraction of 
|YuSu(i,j)| - |YuSu(i,j)| is intuitively performed in the upper and the lower photodiodes of the balanced photo-detector 
(BPD). Based on the subtracted correlation energy passing through a threshold decision device, the multiple label 
interference (MLI) can be eliminated and the corresponding “1” or “0” data bit received from XTRġ #u can be 
accordingly deduced.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Composite signature decoder with complementary subtraction scheme.  
 
Since an eavesdropper is assumed to tap on RCV#1, both RCV#1 and eavesdropper will bear the same signature 
key S1(0,0) = (001 111 101 010 011 000 100) prior to signature reconfiguration. Correlation output energy obtained at 
the upper (forward AWG) and the lower (complementary AWG) photodiodes on both RCV#1 and eavesdropper before 
signature reconfiguration will be Y(pri)uS1(0,0) and Y(pri)uS1(0,0).  On the 1st and the 2nd detection slots, the subtracted 
correlation energy are both of |Y(pri)uS1(0,0)| - | Y(pri)uS1(0,0)| = 15-5 = 10 units data bit power. These bits power are higher 
than the decision threshold level. RCV#1 thus assumes that (1,1, …) data bits was successively transmitted from the 
communicating partner of XTR#1. Table III summarizes numerical results on the decoded data bits on RCV#1 and the 
eavesdropper, on prior to signature reconfigurations.  
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Table III. Perspectives on codec RCV#3 and eavesdropper before signature reconfiguration.  
Before signature reconfigurations with received spectral signals  
Y(pri) = [Y(pri),1, Y(pri),2, …] = [(112 221 202 011 111 010 100), (002 211 111 010 122 110 201), Ƀ].  
 




data bits  
For 
RCV#1  
Y(pri)uS1(0,0) = [Y(pri),1S1(0,0), Y(pri),2S1(0,0), …] 
= [(002 221 202 010 011 000 100),  
(002 211 101 010 022 000 200), …]; 
Y(pri)uS1(0,0) = [Y(pri),1S1(0,0), Y(pri),2S1(0,0), …] 
= [(110 000 000 001 100 010 000),  
(000 000 010 000 100 110 001), …].  
 
|Y(pri),1S1(0,0)| - |Y(pri),1S1(0,0)|  
= 15-5 = 10;  
|Y(pri),2S1(0,0)| - |Y(pri),2S1(0,0)|  
= 15-5 = 10.   
d1 = (1, 1, …) 
For 
Eavesdropper 
Y(pri)uSe(0,0) = [Y(pri),1Se(0,0), Y(pri),2Se(0,0), …] 
= [(002 221 202 010 011 000 100),  
(002 211 101 010 022 000 200), …]; 
Y(pri)uSe(0,0) = [Y(pri),1Se(0,0), Y(pri),2Se(0,0), …] 
= [(110 000 000 001 100 010 000),  
(000 000 010 000 100 110 001), …].  
 
|Y(pri),1Se(0,0)| - |Y(pri),1Se(0,0)|  
= 15-5 = 10;  
|Y(pri),2Se(0,0)| - |Y(pri),2Se(0,0)|  
= 15-5 = 10.   
de = (1, 1, …) 
 
Next, let us examine situation on data bits decoding after signature reconfiguration. Under the same transmitted 
data bits sequences d1 = (1,1, …), d2 = (0,1, …), and d3 = (1,0, …), the received composite spectral signals will be 
Y(pst) = [Y(pst),1, Y(pst),2, …]. On decoding data bits in RCV#1, we note that an eavesdropper is supposed to tap on RCV#1 
to “steal” data bits send to RCV#1. Since transceiver (XTR#1, RCV#1) can duly reconfigure their signature key on the 
thwart of eavesdropping, RCV#1 can correctly decode the desired data bits sent from XTR#1. However, the 
eavesdropper did not know the change of signature key and would decode wrong data bits while it still uses “old key” 
on the received summed signal spectra.  
Specifically, for RCV#1 with new signature key S1(1,0) and the newly received composite signal spectra Y(pst) = 
[Y(pst),1, Y(pst),2, …], correlation output energy for RCV#1 obtained at the upper and the lower photodiodes are 
respectively Y(pst)uS1(1,0) and Y(pst)uS1(1,0). Nevertheless, after signature reconfiguration, the eavesdropper remains with 
its prior signature key Se(0,0). Correlate signature key Se(0,0) with received signal spectra Y(pst) for eavesdropper will 
result in the detected output energy Y(pst)uSe(0,0) and Y(pst)uSe(0,0) at the upper and the lower photodiodes, respectively. 
Following the above discussions, Table IV summarizes numerical results on the decoded data bits sequence for RCV#1 
and the eavesdropper, on posterior to signature reconfiguration.  
 
Table IV. Perspectives on codec RCV#3 and eavesdropper after signature reconfigurations.  
After signature reconfigurations with received spectral signals  
Y(pst) = [Y(pst),1, Y(pst),2, …] = [(110 021 000 211 111 212 102), (211 020 100 221 111 101 012), …] 







Y(pst)uS1(1,0) = [Y(pst),1S1(1,0), Y(pst),2S1(1,0), …]  
= [(100 020 000 211 110 202 002),  
(200 020 000 221 110 101 002), …]; 
Y(pst)uS1(1,0) = [Y(pst),1S1(1,0), Y(pst),2S1(1,0), …]  
= [(010 001 000 000 001 010 100),  
(011 000 100 000 001 000 010), …].  
 
|Y(pst),1S1(1,0)| - |Y(pst),1S1(1,0)| 
= 15-5 = 10; 
|Y(pst),2S1(1,0)| - |Y(pst),2S1(1,0)| 
= 15-5 = 10; 
d3 = (1, 1, …)  
For 
Eavesdropper 
Y(pst)uSe(0,0) = [Y(pst),1Se(0,0), Y(pst),2Se(0,0), …]  
= [(000 021 000 010 011 000 100),  
(001 020 100 020 011 000 000), …]; 
Y(pst)uSe(0,0) = [Y(pst),1Se(0,0), Y(pst),2Se(0,0), …]  
= [(110 000 000 201 100 212 002),  
(210 000 000 201 100 101 012), …].  
 
|Y(pst),1Se(0,0)| - |Y(pst),1Se(0,0)| 
= 7-13 = -6; 
|Y(pst),2Se(0,0)| - |Y(pst),2Se(0,0)| 
= 8-12 = -4; 
de = (0, 0, …)  
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Compare Table IV to Table III, it is clear that if the signature code is not changed, the eavesdropper who detects 
the specific signature code assigned for the corresponding transceiver user can easily detect the data bits sequence for 
that user. That is the reason why we employ dynamic code reconfigurations scheme to change signatures allocated to 
the transceiver users.  
Apparently the dynamic code reconfiguration mechanism can significantly reduce the probability of correct 
information been obtained by attackers via interception, and hence significantly enhances system confidentiality. By 
changing signature code of the tapped transceiver codecs, the eavesdroppers have less chance of intercepting the 
correct code. Simulation results show that the degree of network security is significantly improved when dynamic 
signatures reconfiguration are implemented over the composite M-sequence codes.  
 
5. Network security evaluation 
 The objective of network confidentiality is to ensure that an unauthorized individual does not gain access to data 
contained in the network. The degree of coded-WDM network security is affected by many assumptions. These 
assumptions include, for example, that eavesdropping is carried out with proper tools that are simple to realize using 
commercially available technologies and components, and attackers (eavesdroppers) are technologically intelligent 
with knowledge about signals being transmitted in the networks (i.e. the architecture of the network, types of signals, 
data rates, encoding rules, structure of codes, synchronization, …, etc.). According to the well-known Kerckhoff’s 
principle in cryptography, one should assume that an eavesdropper knows everything about the cryptographic 
algorithm except for the network nodes signature key.  
 
We assume that the eavesdropper knows the code length N and the code weight w. We define the reconfiguration 
time interval to quantify reconfigurable system confidentiality. If the code-searching time S is smaller than the code- 
reconfiguration period R, the system will be intercepted. Therefore, the reconfiguration time interval R must be shorter 
than the code-searching time. Thus, the longer the time required for code breaking, the more secure the system. We 
define the minimum requirements for an eavesdropper to intercept the system as S > R. We assume that the code-
searching time is an exponential distribution: fs(s) = Oe-Os.  
 
If the code-searching time S is smaller than the code-reconfiguration period R, the system will be intercepted. We 
assume that a particular SNR of eavesdroppers to calculate the actual probability that the system is intercepted. The 
probability of an eavesdropper searching the exact signature code within one-bit interval can express as 
P[S > R] = ∫ġrɱOe-Os ds.  
The probability that the system is intercepted, Pintercepted, can be represented as  
Pintercepted = 1 - P[S > R].  
By using above derivation, we can easily define different code size on system confidentiality. From Figure 5, we 
deduce that if we have small code size, the system will reconfigure the signature code more frequently to ensure the 
system confidentiality.  
 
   
Fig. 5. Reconfiguring time versus interception probability under different code size.  
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Improving the degree of security and enhancing the performance of networks impact each other; thus, a decision 
makes for cases in which all or some of these requirements are desired but cannot be fulfilled. From the standpoint of 
security, the designer of a reconfigurable optical network should minimize eavesdropper’s ability to detect code pulses 
by controlling the authorized performance based on reasonable throughput. Otherwise, error-correction coding 
techniques, such as those used in commercial optical communications, would be a simple solution to obtain the 
maximum acceptable system BER. The code reconfiguration thwarts code detection attacks and significantly enhances 
system confidentiality if the transmitter changes the code more quickly than the eavesdropper can break the signature. 
The probability of error-free code detection for an eavesdropper decreases when we employ composite signature codes 
and reconfigurable coding mechanism.  
 
6.  Conclusions  
In this paper, we propose a scheme based on reconfigurable signatures to combat eavesdropping in coded-WDM 
networks. In this scheme, each user is randomly assigned one set of composite M-sequence codes that dynamically 
reconfigure to enhance network confidentiality. When the central station detects a threat in the system, it sends a 
command to each node to change the assigned code sets. Some of the attractive features of the proposed scheme 
include asynchronous network coordination, the reduced number of codecs and enhanced system confidentiality. 
When the number of signature codes increases, it is harder for eavesdropper to detect a certain code. The most 
important feature is the reconfiguration mechanism of signatures that thwarts the attack of code detection from an 
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